Property Dualism, Epiphenomenalism, Brain and Mind

“She does not understand, why? Is it the wine? No...what is it then? What is the reason? But soon it does not matter. Soon the why and the reason are gone, and all that matters is the feeling itself. And this is the nature of the universe; we struggle against it, we fight to deny it, but it is of course pretend, it is a lie. Beneath our poised appearance, the truth is we are completely out of control.  Causality. There is no escaping it. We are forever slaves to it. Our only hope, our only peace is to understand it, to understand the why. Why, is what separates us from them, you from me. Why, is the only real source of power, without it you are powerless”  - The Merovingian, Matrix Reloaded (2003)


1.1 - Clarification

In this essay I will give a very brief overview of the mind body problem, I will give an account of property dualism as a philosophical theory of mind elaborating on the doctrine of supervenience, and the concept of epiphenomenalism; how it arises, its validity and its implications. Finally, I hope that after investigating epiphenomenalism particularly I can conclude something about property dualism generally.

2.1 A brief overview of the more famous theories of mind.

The relation between and the nature of the mind and the brain is in my opinion one the most intriguing topics within contemporary philosophy. The problems encountered are many, and if a clear cut solution is ever found it will most likely carry a tremendous impact into various disciplines of knowledge including religion, psychology, biology and cognitive neuroscience. I will start out by very briefly characterizing four major philosophical theories of mind before moving on to the subject matter.

2.2 Substance dualism.

A substance dualist claims that the body and mind are two essentially different things: A physical body and a non physical soul or mind. The body and soul are linked throughout life, affecting each other, but at death this link is severed.  Descartes famously held this view and attempted several arguments in its favor.

2.3 Three materialist domains.

Perhaps the most famous materialist theory of mind is the mind-brain identity theory. It comes in several versions but they are first and foremost reductionist theories of the mind, which essentially means that mind states can be fully reduced to brain states. The theory stands in direct contrast to Cartesian dualism, and rejects the existence of two separate logical substances. Briefly, if you are experiencing pain, this to the mind-brain identity theorist means that there is something going on inside the brain, such as specific neurons firing, which is causing that sensation of pain; nothing else being accountable. However, the mind brain identity theory never maintains that talk about mental states was equivalent in meaning to talk about brain states. (1) P.66   They still hold that talk about being in pain, and talk about neurons firing in such a manner that the pain is felt, are in fact two separate things. While the mind-brain identity theory sees the mind as a substance, reducible to the brain, analytical behaviourism, on the other hand, maintains that statements about the mental states, is, after investigation, exactly the same as  statements that describe a person’s actual behaviour. According to this theory, the mind is merelyjust the behaviour of the brain. In other words, talk about mental states is equivalent to talk about brain states.  (1) p.98 – 101 The functionalist theory of mind, aligns itself with analytical behaviorism in that it does not recognize the mind as a thing whether or not it is thought of as the soul as Cartesian dualism implies, or the brain as the identity theory holds. However, instead of conceiving the mind as a physical entity it claims it to be a “function”, run on the hardware of the brain, whereby sensory inputs are converted into behavioral outputs. A function can be thought of as the job (mind) something carries out (brain). A function is neither physical nor non physical, but purely causally dependent, and so Functionalism in this way, falls in between both analytical behaviorism and the mind brain identity theory. 1) P. 121 - 123

3.1 an Introduction to property dualism.

The explanations proposed by the theories of mind I have mentioned each face their own individual difficulties. Although we all know (or in the very least, I know) how it is like to consciously experience the world, the mind-brain identity theory, analytical behaviorist and functionalist theories of mind, all materialist in essence, fails to account for consciousness in a serious manner by either removing it from the picture completely or denying its explicit existence. Substance dualism on the other hand wholeheartedly acknowledges states of mind as separate and different from brain states, yet entails at least two other problems, causality relations and individuation,(1.(p.152)) which I won’t investigate in depth here.

I will now consider a theory of mind that does not dismiss our mental properties by reducing them to the purely physical, nor label them as functions of some ghostly Cartesian soul. This position has been formulated as property dualism, which postulates a non-reductive monist theory of mind. Non-reductive monism is “non-reductive” because it does not let our mental properties be directly identified with or ontologically reduced to the properties of the physical, thus acknowledging them as something separate. It is however a monist theory of mind because it denies a classical dualism of substances, it is dualistic with respect to properties. Two questions then naturally rise to mind regarding this view: What is the relationship between the mental and the physical, and how does it arise?

3.2 The supervenience doctrine.

The version of property dualism I will be outlining here, answers the first question by referring to the Doctrine of supervenience. Donald Davidson, a proponent of property dualism in his own right, is known for incorporating the notion of supervenience into the problem of mind. Davidson did not think that an adequate reduction from the mental to the physical was possible. He did however reject substance dualism, denying the existence of a mental event, and operated only with physical events, which he characterized as “concrete non repeatable particulars”, on par with logical substances. (1. (p. 153)) (Logical substances are entities that can exist in their own right, independently of anything else). At the same time Davidson’s events had not only physical properties, but irreducible mental properties as well. His own account of supervenience runs as follows: - “Supervenience can be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects, but differing in some mental respects, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in some physical respect.” (1.p.153)   Mental properties thereby “supervene” on, which directly translated means, “arrives on top of”, the subvenient phenomenon or physical event, and can be thought of as something over and above the physical substance. There are three important aspects to supervenience: Irreducibility, co-variation and dependence.   (1. p. 154)

First off, by definition, supervenient phenomena are analytically irreducible to subvenient phenomena. This is in sharp contrast to what the type-type identity theory maintains. Second. Supervenient phenomena are determined by and co-varies with, changes in the subvenient base, meaning that the supervenient phenomenon can change, but only if  there has occurred coinciding changes in the subvenient phenomenon. It is important to note that the inverse does not obtain; a change in the subvenient phenomenon does not necessarily entail a change in the supervening one. Thus a hypothetical extraterrestrial being can be allowed the same states of mind as I am, even though we most likely will differ in our physical construction. Third, supervenient phenomena proceed from and are existentially dependent upon, the corresponding subvenient phenomena. Meaning that if S stands in relation to B, and B is not to occur, then neither will S. Supervenience as illustrated by Maslin: (1. (p. 155, figure 6))

S depends on B.
S can change, but only if B changes
B can change without it necessarily being the case that S changes.

S= Supervenient phenomenon. B = Basal, subvenient phenomenon

3.3 Causality and emergence.

I have now proposed a property dualistic account of the “relationship” between the mind and the brain, but the second question remains: How does this relationship arise? For John Searle the answer seems obvious; the brain causes the mind. That is, mental states are caused by brain states and are thus features of the brain. Although Searle is unable himself to give a satisfying explanation on how this is to occur, K.T Maslin, maintains that his claim is reasonable, (1. (p. 165)) and even dismiss the existence of such an explanatory causal relation as being crucial to the status of Property Dualism. Taking lesson from Hume’s account on causality he writes: - “If we compare physical to mental causality with physical to physical causality, we cannot complain that we have some special understanding of how one physical event gives rise to another physical event, which we lack in the case of how one physical event gives rise to a mental event. This is because all we ever observe, even in the case of physical to physical causality, is a certain type of event following another type, and exemplifying a counterfactual dependence upon it.” He later continues “Explanations of how one thing causes another must eventually come to an end; we cannot continue citing links in a causal chain. Sooner or later we will reach the last link, and if it is then asked why the event in question was produced by another event, we shall be forced to acknowledge that this is just how things happen. This applies equally to both physical causation and physical to mental causation.” Maslin hereby gives a brief but compelling reason for why property dualism can avoid being restricted by neglecting an explanatory relationship between the physical and the mental. There is still however a serious challenge facing property dualism, one which’s dependent status might yield hard to accept consequences, and that I will now turn towards.

4.1 The case of epiphenomenalism

 We have seen that it may be possible for the mind to be causally produced by the brain with its existence being dependent upon it, but if this is in fact the case, how then can it be possible for the mind to affect the body? As many philosophers have remarked, supervenience seem inevitably to lead to epiphenomenalism. (1. (p.173)) Epiphenomenalism, is the view that our mental states are causally impotent and cannot attribute for changes in our physical world. Epiphenomenalism may be difficult to accept for two reasons. First, it is quite clear to us that in our everyday lives, our mental states have an impact on the physical world. At face value epiphenomenalism does not appear to be correct. Second, if an epiphenomenalistic account of the mind is correct, doesn’t this doom our very being to causal slaves, incapable of free actions? Since the status of property dualism may be dependent on an account on epiphenomenalism, I will attempt to give an overview of both difficulties.

A proponent of epiphenomenalism, Thomas Huxley (1874), compared mental events to a steam whistle that contributes nothing to the work of a locomotive. (2.1) As I mentioned, it appears obvious to us that we by our rich mental life inflict change upon the world, but does this hold under investigation? Let’s now turn to three of the classical arguments raised against epiphenomenalism, while at the same time opening for possible epiphenomenalist responses.

4.2 The argument from absurdity

The argument from absurdity has already been mentioned. It is simply absurd that our mental event does not cause physical reactions when it appears evident that our pains thoughts and feelings make a difference to the world. The argument is clearly very brief, but it is perhaps the greatest reason for many to reject epiphenomenalism.(2.1)

The epiphenomenalist can however reply to the argument by stating that it is not necessarily obvious what causes what, and they can construct an example to parallel the case:  A falling thermometer is followed by a decrease in temperature, but it does not cause it. It can however be called a regularity since it always, unless broken, co-occurs with the temperature change. A regularity however is causal only if it is not explained as a consequence of underlying regularities. It is part of Epiphenomenalist theory, however, that the regularities that we observe to hold between mental events and actions can be explained by underlying regularities: (2(2.1.))  Pains are regularly thought to be the cause of withdrawals by whatever part of the body is experiencing the painful stimuli. In certain cases however, such as burning yourself on a hot plate, the burned body part may retract before the pain is felt. This cannot prove that pain never cause withdrawals, but it can reveal that pain is not necessary as a withdrawal cause. The epiphenomenalist may generalize this to less extreme cases, and maintain that the causal order is the same: Some physical event causes both the withdrawal and the pain.

4.3 The argument from natural selection.

Another argument has its origins in our knowledge of biology, and it runs as follows: Throughout our evolutionary history our human properties have evolved as adaptations to challenges posed by nature in regards to survival or reproduction. Consciousness must thus be an evolved property, and must therefore also be able to inflict change upon the physical world, such it as an adaption actually helped us adapt.

The Epiphenomenalist can however respond to this reasoning by postulating that the very same biological mechanisms are supporting their view. Since an epiphenomenalist think of mental states as the effects of certain physical events, it actually fits their view well that the conscious appraisals we posses, come to be by virtue of the neural cases which these events have been selected for. Surely, if the physiological causes of behavior have been selected for, and can be seen as sufficient causes, then natural selection cannot account for any further effects. (2(2.2))

4.4 The argument from self-stultification

Perhaps the most compelling argument for rejecting the truth of epiphenomenalism is the view that it is incompatible with knowledge of our minds, and by effect incompatible with knowing epiphenomenalism to be true.(2) This position has been reached by implying that knowledge of our mental events requires that these events cause one's knowledge, taken together with the epiphenomenalist rejection of mental events to have physical effects.The argument claims that we either cannot know or mental events, or our knowledge of them cannot be what is causing the plainly physical event of us saying something about our mental events. If this holds, then it appears as epiphenomenalist's are, at the very least, caught in a practical contradiction, in which they must claim to know, or at least believe in a view which implies that they can have no reason to believe it. (2(2.4)) 

An example provided by Robinson Williams (2) may be helpful: "Suppose S in an epiphenomenalist, and that S utters " I am in terrible pain." S is committed to the view that the (experience of) pain does not cause the utterance. But then, it seems S would be making the same utterance whether or not a pain were occurring. If this is so, then S's testimonies about S's own pains are worthless, both to us and to S" - (2011)

The argument thus claims epiphenomenalism to be self stultifying, but this rests on the premise that knowledge of a mental event is caused by that mental event. It does appear as though an epiphenomenalist can reject this premise. Consider the following interactionist diagram (2(2.4))

               M

                  \

                |   C

                       \

                P1   P2 -- P3 --   

P1 is here directly causing M but not P2 which is directly caused by M. P3 is in turn directly caused by P2, and we will assume that it further causes a behavior, such as S assuring us that she is in terrible pain. Here P3 is not directly caused by M but it is plausible to suppose that P3 conveys knowledge of M. Epiphenomenalists can point to that P3 does not have any property containing information with regards to how it was caused: Following the causal chain backwards, one cannot tell whether it was indirectly caused by M or P1 (M’s cause) P3 however does have property that is by our intuition strongly connected to its conveying knowledge of M — namely, that it would not be occurring unless M had recently occurred. If this is the property that is responsible for P3's conveying knowledge of M, an epiphenomenalist does seem to have as much right as anyone to claim that P3 conveys knowledge of M, and so they are in the position of knowing what they claim to know. (A variation of the argument from the argument of self-stultification and further discussion of this can be found in Robinson 2011)

 4.5 In favor of epiphenomenalism?

Looking away from the traditional arguments against epiphenomenalism, I will now turn to a particularly interesting finding within the field of cognitive neuroscience, which perhaps could be said to lend support to its position. Notable arguments in favor of epiphenomenalism which I will not investigate have been given by Jackson (1982) Lewis (1988) and Lyons (2006))

Recognized today as one of the founding figures of modern psychology, Wilhelm Wundt (1912) noted that even the simplest of our sensations is related to a complex combination of numerous nerve processes. (2. (1))  At the same time, the neural events underlying the causes of our behavior are equally if not more complicated. Thus in the causal chain leading to behavior it is natural to look for complex events, which can be found in the neural events that are needed for simple sensations to occur. These sensations are unlikely to contribute to behavior without first having neural effects that is more complex than themselves, and so, if we are to take the anti-epiphenomenalist position,  it would require us to prefer a hypothesis stating that simple sensations cause complex neural events in expense of the here intuitively more appealing hypothesis that complex neural events,  required in any case for the causation of sensations, are adequate to cause the neural events required for the causation of behavior.

With this in mind, let’s look at an experiment first performed in (1985) by Libet and others, which were later advanced and replicated by Soon. et al. (2008) Eddie Nahmias summarizes – “Libet demonstrated that voluntary muscle movements (the flexing of a wrist) are preceded by  “ readiness potentials” (RPs), brain waves in the supplemental motor area (of the cerebral cortex) which occur about half a second (500   ms) before the movement. Libet also had subjects report when they became aware of the “intention, desire, or urge” to move, and this measure suggested that awareness occurred only 150 ms before the movement – 350 ms after the RP.” (4) Libet’s conclusion was striking. He maintained that his experiment had shown how specific voluntary actions are preceded by neuronal events, occurring prior to the awareness of the intension to act. A similar conclusion was later drawn by the researchers investigating the related experiment carried out by Soon (2008), although here the results were even more remarkable: “Analyses of the fMRI data showed specific activity in the frontopolar cortex that predicted which button subjects would press 7 – 10 seconds before the movement!” (3) If these conclusions hold it does indeed appear to point in the direction of epiphenomenalism, as the neural correlates of the supposed free decisions in the brain does not seem to be the cause of actions.

 Although the proponent of epiphenomenalism might be eager to take such research to support the position, it is important to note that this conclusion is far from uncontroversial. Eddy Nahmias for example, suggests that their data to be entirely consistent with alternative interpretations. He points out that the RP’s and earlier frontopolar cortex activity may be correlates with non-conscious urges to move soon, and not the explicit behavior itself, claiming the data to be insufficient in showing the non conscious neural activity to be deterministically causing a particular action(4)

He also suggests, a second possibility, which is that the early non-conscious brain activity could very well be a correlate of the conscious intention, or part of the necessary buildup to  the intentions or decisions themselves. As Daniel Dennett states it - “After all, if we assume that conscious processes correlate with neural processes, we should expect that conscious experiences do not arise out of nowhere and in no time” (1991 ). Some the brain activity might even bear causal relations to earlier conscious processes, and may not be said to carry an impact on the statistical relevance. For a fuller examination of these experiments and others, see Nahmias (2010)

In brief conclusion, I have taken an empirical approach to show that some research may possibly point towards epiphenomenalism. However, more investigation is needed as a direct epiphenomenalist interpretation of these results may be erroneous. As far as I can tell, epiphenomenalism has survived the traditional attacks against it, and might even be said to have some literature supporting it, yet as Robinson notes – “Most recent writers take a somewhat dogmatic position against epiphenomenalism. They presume that epiphenomenalism is to be avoided, going to great lengths in order to achieve this” (2011)

4.6 The unpleasantness of epiphenomenalism

One should be careful of concluding anything about the minds of others, but perhaps doubly so in regards to the philosopher. However, it might be thought that epiphenomenalism is sought to be avoided because its implications possibly could be hard or uncomfortable to accept. As Maslin writes: - “We extend to other people what we believe obtains in our own case, namely, that their desires and beliefs also operate to explain and cause their behavior, which in turn brings about other changes in the world. In fact we only have to look around to witness the innumerable differences that human minds have contributed to the order of things. Epiphenomenalists must deny the truth of all this” (1. (p. 176)) Here I am compelled to agree with Maslin. An epiphenomenalist cannot imply that human minds have contributed to the order of things, as human minds cannot, through epiphenomenal eyes, be said to have a causal effect on the physical world. I do not however share Maslin’s mundane appraisal of epiphenomenalism for this reason alone. 

I believe that in every relevant way, without being an advocate for epiphenomenalism, human beings, under an epiphenomenal account, can be seen as sensing, experiencing persons taking part in the world as a wholesome unit consisting of mind, brain and body. Such a wholesome unit will causally act and react on the world in rational, irrational, creative, constructive or destructive ways. Whether or not the mind actively partakes, it graciously experiences this process as a coherent part of its existence, and perhaps the greatest epiphenomenal consequence would not be the intuitive despair but a mere shift in the way we would act to explain our existence; as more than just a mind.  In any case, the same misfortune of causality Maslin attributes to the epiphenomenalist, will by all appearance eventually also occur to any monist materialist position. The nonchalant character known as The Merovingian exemplifies this through a dialogue occurring in the philosophically oriented blockbuster Matrix Reloaded:  - “You are here because you were sent here, you were told to come here and then you obeyed. It is of course the way of all things. You see, there is only one constant, one universal, it is the only real truth: causality. Action, reaction. Cause, effect.” Essentially this is the everlasting concern regarding ontological freedom. How can we as purely material beings, escape the claws of causality, in a universe where it constitutes the fundamental rule? Ending up as causal slaves is not a problem related to epiphenomenalism alone.

Another variant of the obvious absurdity objection is that epiphenomenalism leads to a “feeling of loss of self”, or a sense that we can no longer regard our actions as ours. I’ve already touched upon this, but to elaborate further, an epiphenomenalist may reply that any sense of loss their view entails, must be common to any view that suggests our mental states to be dependent on our brain states. William Robinson (2011) states that even if we are merely allowing a dualist interactionism (a concept whereby the mental can causally affect the physical, yet being different from it) it would leave us equally dependent on the course of events in our brains. To avoid that, he says, a nonphysical, efficacious self would not be sufficient: One would also have to approve of states of the self which do not have brain- event causes.

In short, although it is understandable how certain entailments of epiphenomenalism could be regarded as unpleasant, unpleasantness does not appear to be a property of epiphenomenalism alone, if it can in fact be said to be a property at all. I should however say that the epiphenomenalist position does not appear popular among the contemporary philosophers, (1.(p.177)) and although I have yet to come across a sound and valid argument clearly capable of refuting the position, there could be reasons for dismissing it that are not accounted for here.

5.1 Conclusion

In this essay I have elaborated the case of property dualism and given an account of epiphenomenalism. In light of the information I have presented, I maintain that this form of property dualism can be seen as a serious and currently adequate theory of mind as long as epiphenomenalism holds. The field is divided on this issue, but there are reasons to think that the traditional arguments against the position fail, and there are indicators lending strength to the concept which has yet to be explored fully. I have also attempted to dismiss the notion that the position entails unwanted consequences that other theories of mind avoids. I think I will end by asking you to go back to the opening quote, for perhaps we are in a better position now to appreciate it.

Sources:

1) An introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, 2.Ed,( 2007) - K. T. Maslin

2)  Robinson, William, "Epiphenomenalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), plato.stanford.edu/archives/su…

3) Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain. www.socialbehavior.uzh.ch/teac…

4) Scientific challenges to free will www2.gsu.edu/~phlean/papers/Sc…

5) en.wikiquote.org/wiki/The_Matr…

As a side note, CJ Lyons have differentiated between event epiphenomenalism and property epiphenomenalism, a distinction Invoked in favor of epiphenomenalism, but which I have not taken into account here.